Petitioners Motion To Quash Ocr¶

FILED 11/29/2023 10:30 AM CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT DEKALB COUNTY GEORGIA

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF DEKALB COUNTY STATE OF GEORGIA

JONATHAN SWEATMAN, Petitioner, v.

SARAH ZEEMAN,

Respondent / Counterclaim Petitioner. Vv.

JONATHAN SWEATMAN, Counterclaim Respondent.

SL0P7ITF)?

CIVIL ACTION

FILE NO. 21CV9795

PETITIONER/COUNTERCLAIM RESPONDENT JONATHAN SWEATMAN’S MOTION TO QUASH AND FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER AND MEMORADUM OF LAW

COMES NOW, Jonathan Sweatman, Petitioner/Counterclaim Respondent in the abovestyled civil action, and files this motion pursuant to O.C.G.A. § §9-11-26(c), 24-13-23(b)(2) and other applicable laws for a protective order and order to quash the subpoenas to Jonathan Sweatman to produce documents, showing the Court as follows: STATEMENTS OF FACTS

This case involves a dispute between neighbors regarding the placement of a subject fence, the property boundary line between the neighbor’s property, alleged stormwater runoff damage, and encroachments.

Jonathan Sweatman (“Sweatman’) filed his Complaint against Sarah Zeeman

(“Zeeman”) asserting that he has legal title and interest in the property which is currently being disputed by Sweatman and Zeeman. (See Verified Petition for Equitable Relief ¥ 1). Zeeman filed

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a Counterclaim, claiming that Sweatman undertook a series of renovations and improvements to his property that encroached onto Zeeman’s property and caused an increased, unnatural amount of water to collect and accumulate on Zeeman’s property. (See Verified Answer And Counterclaim Of Respondent Sarah Zeeman § 13). On September 11, 2023, Zeeman filed an amendment to her Answer and Counterclaim withdrawing her “claims for emotional distress.” (See Defendant’s First Amendment To Answer and Counterclaim.) In Zeeman’s deposition on July 11, 2023, Zeeman’s counsel also stated, “to the extent that we’ve implied that that’s, in essence, an invasion of privacy, we abandon that.” Zeeman Dep. 117:22-24.

On or about October 30, 2023, Zeeman’s counsel served Jonathan Sweatman with a Notice to Produce a list of documents at trial, which included requests for both his personal and

business tax returns for the years of 2021, 2022, and 2023.! (See Notice to Produce, attached hereto as Exhibit “A”). Zeeman’s counsel has provided no justification regarding the request of these tax documents, nor have they stated any nexus between the tax documents they are seeking and Zeeman’s claims against Sweatman. Therefore, the Court should GRANT Sweatman’s Motion to Quash. ARGUMENT AND CITATION OF AUTHORITY

Upon motion by a party and for good cause shown, the court may order that discovery not be had to protect a person or party from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or undue burden or expense. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-26(c). Trial courts have broad discretion over discovery, including entering protective orders.

Gibbs v. Abiose, 508 S.E.2d 690, 695 (Ga. App. 1999); Douglas

Asphalt Co. v. Linnenkohl, 741 S.E.2d 169, 170 (Ga. App. 2013). Appellate courts will not reverse trial courts’ discretion on such matters unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion. Id.

' Sweatman’s tax returns from 2023 are not currently available to him as we are still within the year of 2023.

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Trial courts have broad discretion over discovery, including entering protective orders, in order to ensure that discovery is not used to harass other parties and to prevent oppression, undue expense, and unreasonable use of discovery. Burgen v. Cardiop Well Medical, Inc., 175 Ga. App. 700, 335 S.E.2d 28 (1988). The court’s broad discretion in this way will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of abuse of discretion.

Jackson v. Gordon, 122 Ga. App. 657, 178 S.E.2d 310

(1970).

“Unless clearly required in the interests of justice, litigants ought not to be required to submit (income tax) returns as the price for bringing or defending a lawsuit.’ Snellings v. Sheppard, 229 Ga. App. 753, 757 (1997). “In balancing one party's right to discovery against another party's right to privacy, [Georgia Courts] have held that [t]he interests of justice do not require production of tax returns in the face of [an OCGA § 9—11—26(c)] motion for protective order [or an OCGA § 9—11—34(b)(2) objection to a request for production of documents] where other discovery methods are available to obtain the same information.” Id. In balancing the plaintiff's right of discovery against the defendant's right to privacy in such cases, the majority of those jurisdictions which have considered the issue have been unwilling to permit discovery of the defendant's financial condition based on the plaintiff's mere allegation that he is liable for punitive damages but has instead required the plaintiff to make a prima facie showing of the facts giving rise to such liability. Holman v. Burgess, 199 Ga. App. 61, 404 S.E.2d 144 (1991).Also, it has been held almost uniformly that where pre-trial discovery of the defendant's financial resources is authorized, the

scope of such should be restricted to the extent necessary to prevent an unreasonable intrusion into the defendant's privacy. Id.

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I.

Zeeman’s Has Given No Justification As To Why Sweatman Should Provide The Records

This case is essentially involving a boundary line dispute, stormwater runoff damages, and encroachments. Zeeman has presented no valid reason in which Sweatman’s tax statements are warranted in this case aside from the purpose of causing Sweatman embarrassment, harassment, and presenting him an undue burden. This is evident by the fact that one of the documents that

Zeeman is asking for is not even yet available to Sweatman, such as his 2023 tax return. The request of this non-existent tax return is further proof that Zeeman’s request for Sweatman’s tax returns is nothing but a fishing expedition with no real direction or objective. Furthermore, this

case hinges around a residential property line and water flow dispute between Sweatman and Zeeman and has nothing to do with Sweatman’s business affairs or means of employment. Therefore, there is absolutely no reason that Sweatman should be required to provide his business tax return in response to Zeeman’s document request.

While Zeeman originally brought an

invasion of privacy claim against Zeeman, she has since amended her Complaint to drop any claims for emotional distress, including her invasion of privacy claims against Sweatman. Zeeman

has provided no justification as to why punitive damages would be warranted based on her remaining claims, and they should therefore not be awarded to Zeeman absent such showing.

II.

Zeeman Seeks Financial Information Irrelevant To This Case Concerning Sweatman’s Business and Personal Tax Returns

Zeeman seeks Sweatman’s tax returns for the past three years, which relates to cases wholly irrelevant to this matter and which may contain sensitive personal information to which Zeeman is not entitled.

Zeeman’s request for information on this topic is overly broad and Zeeman has

failed to make even a threshold showing of how said information is relevant and admissible in this

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case.

Accordingly, Sweatman asks that all requests related to any financial affidavits and

billing/income information as to Sweatman be quashed as irrelevant. Though Zeeman is making a claim for punitive damages against Sweatman, which in some

cases would warrant access to an individual’s financial records, in the present case Zeeman has failed to provide any evidence that a factual basis exists for her punitive damages claim against Sweatman. Therefore, Zeeman has not met her burden and is not entitled to Sweatman’s financial information. In Holman v. Burgess, 199 Ga. App. 61, the plaintiff sued her former landlord and

sought to recover general and special damages plus punitive damages, alleging trespass and conversion. The plaintiff requested certain financial records and the defendant objected to request.

The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion to compel responses.

On interlocutory appeal, the

Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment and held that (1) the plaintiff was not entitled to discover information concerning defendant's personal financial resources absent an evidentiary showing—by affidavit, discovery responses, or otherwise—that factual basis exists for the plaintiff's punitive damages claim, and (2) even if factual basis existed for punitive damages claim,

request for production was so manifestly burdensome and oppressive that trial court could not compel responses based on the fact that the plaintiff had not first established a basis for her punitive claim to support her request for the defendant’s tax income return documents. Holman v. Burgess is analogous to the present case in that Zeeman has not provided a basis of support for her punitive claims. She has provided no justification as to why the requested documents are relevant to any of her claims, nor has she given any explanation of how the requested documents would support, established, or prove any of her claims or contentions against Sweatman. Absent this evidentiary showing on Zeeman’s party via affidavit, discovery responses, or otherwise, Zeeman would not be entitled to Sweatman’s tax returns just as the Plaintiff in

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Holman v. Burgess was not entitled to tax returns. Just as the plaintiff in Holman v. Burgess, Zeeman has failed to show that Sweatman’s financial records are in any way related to any of the

claims she brought against Sweatman.? CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above and pursuant to the authority of O.C.G.A. §§ 9-11-26(c), Sweatman respectfully requests that the Court quash the request for production of documents directed at Sweatman regarding his tax returns in their entirety,